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ABSTRACT: This article examines the British policy towards the Little Entente 
alliance comprised of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania in connexion 
with the preparation and proceedings of the Genoa Conference of 1922. In do-
ing so the paper challenges the usual perception of the Little Entente’s attitude 
towards the conference as completely pro-French and thus obstructive, and sug-
gests that British policy-makers to a large extent misinterpreted the inclinations 
and intentions of the three smaller powers and failed to pursue a more positive 
and effective policy. The reasons for this failure are to be found in the mixture of 
prejudiced views regarding the alliance and misperceptions of Lloyd George.  
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The Genoa conference, its origins and the aftermath is thoroughly stu-
died in Carole Fink’s work.1 She also edited together with Axel Frohn and Jürgen 
Heideking thirteen essays covering different aspects of the conference.2 Stephen 
White examines the subject in a wider scope of the Soviet-Western exchanges in 
the early 1920’s.3 There are a few articles which discuss the Genoa gathering 
from the perspective of individual participating countries.4 A number of speeches 
and other documentary sources in connexion with the conference were published 
in the contemporary account by John Saxon Mills which is in its commentary 
strongly biased in its praise of the role of the British Prime Minister Lloyd Geor-
ge.5 This paper aims at exploring a particular facet of British foreign policy in 
                                                 
1 Carole Fink, The Genoa Conference: European Diplomacy, 1921–1922 (Chapel Hill, 1984). 
2 Carole Fink, Axel Frohn, and Jürgen Heideking (eds), Genoa, Rapallo and European 
Reconstruction in 1922 (Washington D. C.: German Historical Institute; Cambridge, 1991). 
3 Stephen White, The Origins of Détente: The Genoa Conference and Soviet-Western Re-
lations, 1921–1922 (Cambridge, 1985).  
4 Anne Orde, ’France and the Genoa Conference of 1922’, Mitteilungen des 
Österreichischen Staatsarchivis, 37 (1984), 325–361; Carole Fink, ’Italy and the Genoa Conference 
of 1922’, International History Review, vol. 8, no. 1 (1986), 41–55; Alena Gajanová, ’La politique 
extérieure tchécoslovaque et la “question russe“ à la Conférence de Gênes’, Historica-Prague 8 
(1964), 135–176. 
5 John Saxon Mills, The Genoa Conference (London, 1922). 
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preparation to and during the conference – namely policy towards the Little En-
tente, the alliance consisting of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania.  
When Lloyd George decided to address the problem of European econo-
mic reconstruction at the end of 1921 it aroused many hopes and fears throughout 
Europe. The attainment of that ambitious goal was envisaged through the means 
of a spectacular conference which was to gather around the same table for the 
first time since the Great War victors and vanquished alike. Lloyd George’s 
grand design should have primarily dealt with establishing economic relations 
with Soviet Russia. The economic program was inextricable from the far-reac-
hing political implications. Commercial cooperation could not be contemplated 
were it not for some kind of settlement of the outstanding questions between Mo-
scow and Western Powers.  
The stumbling block of the prospective rapprochement was how to resol-
ve the former debts of the previous Russian governments incurred before and du-
ring the war. To make the problem more difficult these debts were not only in-
curred due to inter-governmental loans but also to borrowing from private citi-
zens whose properties were nationalised without any compensation. Furthermore, 
it seemed obvious that settlement of such complex issues would require the resto-
ration of the regular and official channels of communication not likely to fall 
short of de jure recognition of the Soviet government.  
The French did not share Lloyd George’s enthusiasm as the conference 
appeared to them to have been imbued with serious risks. Somewhat broadly de-
fined aims, as professed by the British Prime Minister, were likely to encroach on 
what the French considered to be beyond the scope of any discussion, namely the 
sanctity of the peace treaties and reparation sums. In addition, Paris took an unfa-
vourable view of the rapprochement with the Soviets, and was particularly ill-
disposed to de jure recognition of Lenin’s adherents. Heretofore France had 
been pursuing exactly the opposite policy–effective isolation of the Bolsheviks 
whose downfall on the account of disastrous domestic situation was hoped and 
expected.  
In order to prepare the ground for the conference the British premier had 
talks with his French counterpart Aristide Briand on the occasion of the Allied 
Supreme Council meeting from 4 to 11 January 1922 in the resort city of Cannes. 
The results of those exchanges were the six Cannes Resolutions adopted by the 
Supreme Council laying down basic principles and conditions for a rapproche-
ment with the Bolshevik regime.6 A central point in the resolutions was the requ-
est for recognition of all tsarist Russia’s debts and financial, legal and juridical 
accommodation on the part of the Soviets to secure the property and rights of the 
prospective foreign investors.7 The end of the illegal communist activities was 
                                                 
6 The text of the Cannes resolutions can be found in Fink, The Genoa Conference, 40. 
7 From the Soviet point of view the issue of debts recognition infringed on the principles 
of the revolution itself.  
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demanded by the undertaking ’to refrain from propaganda subversive of order 
and established political system in other countries’. The sixth resolution called 
for all countries to restrain from aggression against their neighbours. Soviet Rus-
sia was to be placated by the proclamation of every country’s right to choose the-
ir system of ownership and government. Finally, the prospect of official recogni-
tion was dangled in front of the Bolsheviks subject to full acceptance of the Can-
nes stipulations. 
Briand went out of his way to come to terms with Lloyd George but his 
good will was not reciprocated. He yielded in the Russian matters, accepted the 
idea of a non-aggression pact and even showed signs of readiness to agree to 
grant Germany a moratorium on impending reparations expecting in return to 
conclude a much coveted Anglo-French alliance treaty. But he was offered not-
hing more than a simple British guarantee against an unprovoked German inva-
sion. Consequently, after having expounded his foreign policy in front of the dis-
gruntled Chamber Briand resigned on 12 January and a new cabinet headed by 
the hardliner Raymond Poincaré came into office.  
Making an effort to win over as many other states as possible to one’s 
standpoint became an essential part of rallying support for the impending sum-
mit. In addition to five so-called inviting countries (Great Britain, France, Italy, 
Belgium and Japan), Soviet Russia, Germany, the neutrals and the East European 
countries were to take part at the gathering as well. The Little Entente thus found 
itself in an awkward position in relation to the conflicting agendas of the Princi-
pal Allies. As the staunchest keepers of the status quo the successor states could 
be expected to observe the preservation of the peace treaties to their utmost. In 
that respect their stance entirely coincided with the French one. On the other 
hand, the prolonged wrangles between London and Paris could result in the rup-
ture of the Entente and there was nothing that the Little Entente states dreaded 
more. If France and Britain had gone their separate ways the small successor sta-
tes would have been faced with the unthankful decision of taking sides with one 
or the other, a contingency that spelled uncertain and dangerous prospects for the 
future.  
Czechoslovak Prime Minister (and Foreign Minister) Edvard Beneš 
played a prominent role during diplomatic preliminaries to the Genoa gathering. 
On 13 February 1922 he met with Poincaré in Paris. Although Beneš himself re-
garded any precipitated action for official recognition of Soviet Russia by dint of 
an international conference as a mistake,8 he did try to influence the French pre-
mier to adopt a more moderate policy. In fact, Beneš communicated to Czecho-
                                                 
8 Ch. Amort, A. H. Klevanskij, A. I. Nedorezov and J. Pivoluska (eds), Dokumenty I ma-
terially po istorii sovetsko-chechoslovatskikh otnoshenii vol. I, (Moscow, 1973), No. 421, Beneš’s 
telegram to the diplomatic mission at Bern; This is what Beneš believed to be the right approach to 
the problem: ’Right tactics-gradually proceed straightforward, enforce concessions to anti-bolshe-
vist position and gradually give away political, diplomatic, legal and economic concessions to the 
current Russian regime.’ 
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slovak President Thomas Masaryk that the French would modify their intransi-
gent stand on Russian matters.9  
When Beneš conferred with Lloyd George on 17 February in London, he 
pleaded for the agreement between Britain and France, deemed as crucial for the 
stability of Central Europe. Czechoslovak Prime Minister pressed for the settle-
ment of the reparations question which he believed to be of the paramount impor-
tance in the reconstruction of Europe; on that note he pointed out that the aim 
should be to have an agreement which would result in Germany’s paying money 
to France, but which would provide at the same time a moratorium to Germany 
so as to enable that country to improve its financial position. Such a policy would 
have the effect of raising the cost of production in Germany so that other countri-
es would no longer be unable to compete with her. A reparation settlement on so-
me such lines would clarify the position between France and Germany. If no such 
agreement was reached, he felt that Europe would fall to pieces.10 
Lloyd George was not inclined to discuss reparations with Beneš. He 
conceded a postponement of the gathering until the end of March. As regards the 
participation of the East European states at the preliminary conference that was 
about to be held in London, as proposed by Poincaré, Lloyd George declined to 
concur. He contended that those countries were unprepared and agricultural, ex-
cept for Czechoslovakia, and stressed the difficulty of excluding all other countri-
es which could also request to be admitted at the London meeting. The most im-
portant decision reached during the conversation was to enlist Beneš’s services to 
act as a mediator and visit Paris at once in order to procure a personal meeting 
between the British and French premiers so that all outstanding questions pertai-
ning to the forthcoming conference could be finally cleared up.  
Three days later the two Prime Ministers met for the second time and this 
conversation was primarily dedicated to the Russian matters.11 Beneš had prepa-
red an aide memoire for presentation to Poincaré enumerating eight basic princi-
ples on which France and Britain should agree as a basis for the proceedings at 
Genoa.12 In respect of Soviet Russia the procedure to be adopted presupposed a 
long and complicated process by which economic issues were first to be resol-
ved, and then political conditions should be laid down the realisation of which, 
through introduction of a certain delay that would secure evidence of a good faith 
on the part of the Russians, could eventually lead to de jure recognition. Such a 
proposition fell far away from what was expected in London and Lloyd George 
turned it down as unacceptable. The latter put forward all the arguments in favour 
                                                 
9 Frank Hadler, ’The European Policy of Czechoslovakia on the Eve of the Genoa Confe-
rence of 1922’ in Genoa, Rapallo and European Reconstruction in 1922, 171–185 (179).  
10 TNA, Memorandum of a conversation between Lloyd George and Benes, 17 February 
1922, C 2675/458/62, FO 371/7420. 
11 TNA, Memorandum of a meeting between Lloyd George and Benes, 20 February 
1922, C 2739/458/62, FO 371/7420. 
12 Ibid., the text of the aide memoire is attached.  
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of recognition and insisted on the alteration of the aide memoire along the lines 
of the Cannes decisions. Having been submitted to the Foreign Office Beneš’s 
proposal for the progressive recognition of the Soviet government was, however, 
viewed differently by John Gregory of Northern Department who found it im-
mensely advantageous for two reasons: a compromise on these lines would be ac-
ceptable to France and the smaller powers and, more importantly, it would secure 
a unity of front against Bolsheviks’ tactics of playing for division in the capitalist 
camp.13 This was a clear indication how some officials within the government did 
not see eye to eye with the Prime Minister as regards his conference plans.14   
It has been alleged that Beneš’s mediation was crucial in bringing about 
the meeting between Poincaré and Lloyd George at Boulogne-sur-Mer on 25 Fe-
bruary.15 In fact, the Welshman was negotiating with Poincaré using Lord Derby 
and the French Ambassador Saint Aulaire as intermediaries and going behind the 
back of his own Foreign Secretary while exploiting Beneš, in Alan Sharp’s 
words, as a decoy.16 The French premier was inclined to interpret the outcome of 
the Anglo-French exchanges as a ’mutual success’ of France and Little Entente, 
though one of which it was better to keep quiet so as not to wound the susceptibi-
lities of the English.17 In the circumstances the sincerity of Poincaré’s utterances 
appears to have been doubtful but the prestige of Beneš was certainly enhanced 
by his mediating role.           
In the meanwhile, the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Nikola Pašić, and Fore-
ign Minister, Momčilo Ninčić, visited Bucharest in connection with a royal be-
trothal and discussed the pending conference with their Romanian counterparts 
Ion Bratianu and Ion Duca respectively. In these talks they were joined by the 
Czechoslovak ambassador and Polish Minister for Foreign affairs, Konstanty 
Skirmunt. The latter was trying, quite in line with his policy of rapprochement 
with Prague, to create a common front with the Little Entente, and they agreed on 
the principle of intangibility of the borders.18 The decision was reached to sum-
mon an expert meeting at Belgrade, Polish delegates included, at the beginning of 
March to make final preparations for a joined stand at Genoa.19 The Romanian 
                                                 
13 TNA, Cabinet Offices to FO, 22 February 1922, C 2931/458/62, FO 371/7421; it con-
tains the version of Beneš’s aide memoire amended according to Lloyd George’s remarks.  
14 For the opposition to Lloyd George’s Russian policy see White, The Origins of Déten-
te, 43–44. 
15 Magda Ádám, ’The Genoa Conference and the Little Entente’ in Genoa, Rapallo and 
European Reconstruction in 1922, 187–199 (194). 
16 Alan Sharp, ’Lord Curzon and the Foreign Office’ in Roger Bullen (ed) The Foreign 
Office, 1782–1982 (Maryland, 1984), 66–84 (73); Ephraim Maisel, The Foreign Office and Foreign 
Policy, 1919–1926 (Brighton, 1994), 81. 
17 Léopold Marceilin, Politique et politicians d’après guerre, vol. 3 (Paris, 1924), 333 qu-
oted in Alla Jazkova, Malaja Antanta v evropejskej politike, 1818–1925 (Moscow, 1974), 215.  
18 Piotr Wandycs, France and her Eastern Allies, 1919–1925: French-Czechoslovak-Po-
lish Relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno (Minneapolis, 1962), 259. 
19 TNA, Dering to FO, 24 February 1922, C 2822/458/62, FO 371/7420.  
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government had sounded out Rome as to the possibility of postponement of the 
gathering due to the general elections that were to be conducted in their country 
during the first half of March.  
In relation to Russia both the Romanians and Yugoslavs were reserved 
and did not consider recognition opportune until the Soviet government had gi-
ven ample evidence of their loyalty to other countries; each state should, it was 
believed, regulate its economic relations with the Soviets on its own terms.20 The 
Romanians were always on their guard against the Soviets in the province of 
Bessarabia21 which had recently been exposed to extensive communist propagan-
da, whereas the Yugoslavs suspected that plots were being organised in Russia 
with a view to assassinating their King. Nevertheless, Ninčić was at pains to 
stress the resolve of his cabinet not to get involved in the Russian internal matters 
and persisted in presenting the hospitality granted to a considerable number of 
Russian refugees, supporters of the old regime, as having sprung purely from hu-
manitarian reasons.22         
Having concluded his go-between task in Paris and London, Beneš could 
finally catch up with the preparations of his allies within the Little Entente. He 
conferred with Ninčić at Bratislava and, obviously influenced by Lloyd George’s 
standpoint, pressed for signs of good will towards the Soviets – at least, the re-
traction of support to General Wrangel, commander-in-chief of the White Russi-
ans, and readiness to establish commercial relations – which was conceded by the 
Yugoslav.23 A close association of Poland with the Little Entente pushed through 
by his allies at the previous meeting at Bucharest was distasteful to Beneš on ac-
count of his wish both to keep away from the entanglements of the Russo-Polish 
relations and to preserve his own political preponderance in the alliance. For the-
se reasons he persisted in defining position of Poland towards Little Entente as 
’closely associated rather than allied power’.24 The accommodating spirit shown 
by Ninčić was reciprocated with regards to common policy towards Italy, always 
the main concern of Yugoslav foreign policy. It was decided to decline Italian 
meddling in any question concerning the succession states that did not involve di-
rect interest of Rome.25  
Not surprisingly, France took the initiative to align the Little Entente co-
untries with its policy. In his report from Prague Sir George Clerk drew the atten-
tion of his superiors to an article, written by the prominent French author, which 
called on the Little Entente ’to take the role of arbitrator’ in case ’there be direct 
                                                 
20 TNA, Dering to Curzon, 24 February 1922, C 3286/458/62, FO 371/7421. 
21 The Soviets never recognised the union of December 1918 between Romania and Bes-
sarabia which was formerly a part of the Russian Empire. 
22 TNA, Young to Curzon, 2 March 1922, C 3263/458/62, FO 371/7421.  
23 TNA, Clerk to FO, 4 March 1922, C 3203/458/62, FO 371/7421; Gajanová, ’La politi-
que extérieure tchécoslovaque et la “question russe“ à la Conférence de Gênes’, 154–155. 
24 TNA, Clerk to FO, 4 March 1922, C 3203/458/62, FO 371/7421.   
25 Ibid.  
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opposition between the points of view of England and France.’26 The report arou-
sed considerable interest amongst the Foreign Office staff. Miles Lampson of 
Central Department remarked that it was traditional French policy to ’get as 
many of these small states as possible under her wing’.27 On the practical side, 
John Gregory considered what could be done to hinder any substantial influence 
that ’the lesser Powers’ might exert at the proceedings in Genoa: A skilful pro-
gramme of procedure may go some way to prevent lesser Powers from obstruc-
ting and intriguing badly. It is at present proposed that not only the main Genoa 
Conference, but the Committees into which it will split up and the Subcommitte-
es into which the Committees will in their turn split up, should each be controlled 
by a ’Bureau de Comité’ (a management) which will be carefully constituted and 
act as a censor. Other measures of a less formal nature with the same object in vi-
ew are also contemplated. This course would have a political as well as an admi-
nistrative effect and should leave the guidance of the Conference more or less in 
the hands of the main Powers.28 
The underlining assumption, in the context of previous comments, was 
that the impact that the Little Entente might have on the conference would doub-
tlessly be pro-French and thus detrimental for the British interests. It was such an 
attitude that accounted for the decision that the Little Entente and Polish delega-
tes should not be invited to the preliminary session of 9 April. In turn, British ef-
forts to marginalise the smaller allies could not fail to cause soreness especially 
at Bucharest and Belgrade.29   
Lloyd George went even further and thought that the Little Entente atti-
tude might adversely affect the French stand rather than the other way round. In 
his conversation with the Italian Foreign Minister, Carlo Schanzer, on the eve of 
the gathering he professed that the peril of the French breaking the united Allied 
front would depend upon the degree of the support they extracted for their negati-
ve attitude from the Little Entente and concluded: ’This was the crux of the con-
ference.’30 Consequently, he attached great importance to winning over the alli-
ance to the support of British and Italian policy and encouraged Schanzer to get 
into personal contact with the Romanian premier Bratiano.  
However, the attitude of the smaller allies appears to have been somew-
hat different and more complex as presented in the reports from the British lega-
tions in Belgrade, Prague and Bucharest and memoranda produced in Whitehall 
on the basis of such reports. After conversations in Bucharest and Bratislava held 
                                                 
26 TNA, Clerk to Curzon, 11 March 1922, C 4109/458/62, FO 371/7422. 
27 TNA, Minutes by Lampson, 22 March 1922, ibid.  
28 TNA, Minutes by Gregory, 23 March 1922, ibid.  
29 TNA, Clerk to Curzon, 4 March 1922, C 3203/458/62 and Young to Curzon, 2 March 
1922, C 3263/458/62 in FO 371/7421.  
30 W. N. Medlicott, D. Dakin and M. E. Lambert (eds) Documents on British Foreign Po-
licy, 1919–1939, series I, vol. 19 [hereafter cited as DBFP, I, 19] (London: HMSO, 1974), No. 63, 
Note of a Conversation at the Villa d’Albertis, 8 April 1922. 
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on the highest level the last stage of preparatory work on presenting the common 
policy of the ‘Quadruple Entente’ took place at the expert meeting at Belgrade on 
5 March 1922. Their concerns were manifold. Typical of the successor states’ je-
alousy of their economic independence, the Yugoslav press constantly feared that 
smaller countries would be taken in tow by mighty international corporations and 
thus degenerate into colonies.31 British Minister in Belgrade, Sir Alban Young, 
provided his chiefs with the most comprehensive picture of the background and 
meaning of such fears as confirmed at the experts’ meeting. In respect of the eco-
nomic plans the delegates were determined to stand ground firmly against any at-
tempts of the Greater Powers to impose in the prosecution of their remedial mea-
sures any sort of control or other obligation lessening the sovereign rights of the 
small States, or at any rate lessening them in a measure not applicable to all Po-
wers alike, e. g. any control over international communications, over currencies, 
over banking operations. It has been feared that it may be proposed to afford fi-
nancial credits through the instrumentality of the Banks in Vienna and Budapest. 
I have never ceased to report since my arrival here that this country resists to the 
utmost any financial or commercial schemes which centered in either of those 
two capitals would seek to operate on a scale of any magnitude in this country, 
and if I am not misinformed this spirit has found new force in the recent meetings 
of the delegates of the Succession States.32  
The unswerving refusal to establish links with the banks situated in the 
former enemy countries originated from the conviction that economic penetration 
would be the thin edge of the wedge for accomplishing the ultimate restoration of 
Austria-Hungary. In such circumstances Young passed the following judgment: 
’The problem therefore will be to reconcile schemes of financial betterment and 
the securities necessary thereto with these susceptibilities of the beneficiaries.’33 
As for the extent of the expert contribution that the delegates gathered at Belgra-
de could provide, he was quite skeptical and wondered ‘what sort of profitable 
expert advice the Poles, the Serbs and the Roumanians will be able to afford each 
other.’34  
In fact, the Little Entente’s susceptibilities were mostly unfounded given 
the actual frame of mind of the policy-makers in both Paris and London. The 
French inter-departmental committee unequivocally stated in its report of 8 
March that it ’did not think it necessary to insist on re-establishing links among 
the Danubian states nor to stress the role of Vienna.’35 The committee took this 
view on entirely political ground as it found it obvious that any action to the con-
trary would deepen the succession countries’ fear of the revision of the Austrian 
                                                 
31 TNA, Young to Curzon, 23 February 1922, C 2896/458/62, FO 371/7421. 
32 TNA, Young to Curzon, 16 March 1922, C 4078/458/62, FO 371/7422. 
33 Ibid.  
34 TNA, Young to Curzon, 2 March 1922, C 3263/458/62, FO 371/7421. 
35 Orde, ’France and the Genoa Conference of 1922’, 339. 
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and Hungarian peace treaties at their expense. The British, on the other hand, did 
not prepare any concrete programme of economic reconstruction either for Rus-
sia or for the other states of East Central Europe. From a purely financial point of 
view Yugoslav Minister of Finance Kosta Kumanudi sneered at the possibilities 
of obtaining benefit from the Genoa Conference and the projected international 
corporation that appeared to be asking for money from the countries in need in-
stead of distributing it to them.36  
The attitude of the Little Entente regarding the crucial Russian question 
was particularly intriguing. All the members had in common the repellence to 
bolshevist propaganda. Each country viewed the rapprochement with the Soviets 
in relation to its own distinctive circumstances. Naturally, the Romanians could 
be counted on to display the most intransigence due to the territorial dispute over 
Bessarabia. The third secretary at the Central Department, John Troutbeck, ar-
gued that Yugoslavia was in the long run eager to establish friendly relations 
with any government that emerged victorious in Russia, and resume the traditio-
nal policy by which ’Russia will again take her place in the politics of Europe 
and protect her Slav brethren from the encroachments of the Teuton and the La-
tin.’37 Faced with the uncertainty of the turn of events, Belgrade was vacillating 
between its old anti-bolshevist tendency and the more practical need to establish 
at least commercial relations with the Soviets. After the conversations Beneš had 
had with Lloyd George the Yugoslavs seemed to have also shifted towards more 
lenient stand on the Russian issue. Young accurately summarised the attitude of 
the whole group when he predicted that it would be one of expectancy.38 Overall, 
such a stance was not discouraging from the British point of view. There was no 
love lost for Lloyd George’s designs indeed, but at least the Little Entente states 
were not disposed to put obstacles in the way of pursuing a modus vivendi with 
the Soviets.        
Interestingly, Young was under the impression that most was expected 
from clearing up of the reparations question so that the precise amount of liquid 
money available could be finally known.39 It is worth noting that the Little Enten-
te’s standpoint was close to Britain’s insofar as it did not take too seriously the 
assurances given to Poincaré as to the exclusion of reparations from the agenda at 
Genoa. ’No two person seem agreed as to how far the question of reparations is 
excluded from the purview of the conference since all admit that the problem of 
European reconstruction in the main turns on reparations in one aspect or anot-
her’, Young reported and humorously added that, ’any economic discussion 
which ignores that pivot seems like playing Hamlet without the title role.’40 Nin-
čić even expressed his personal opinion to the British envoy that ’the ruthless 
                                                 
36 TNA, Young to Curzon, 16 March 1922, C 4078/458/62, FO 371/7422.  
37 TNA, Note by Troutbeck, 20 March 1922, C 4208/458/62, FO 371/7422.  
38 Ibid.    
39 TNA, Young to Curzon, 16 March 1922, C 4078/458/62, FO 371/7422.  
40 TNA, Young to Curzon, 9 March 1922, C 3742/458/62, FO 371/7422.  
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exaction of German reparations was incompatible with the restoration of a nor-
mal Europe.’41 
The one point on which Little Entente was bound to close ranks with the 
French was an absolute refusal to allow the slightest revision of the peace treati-
es. It was not only the rectification of one or the other frontier line that was at sta-
ke for the successor states, but rather the danger of stirring up internal troubles by 
giving the ear of the conference to all the discontent elements within their bor-
ders. Ninčić complained to Young about the Italian intrigues in the province of 
Montenegro and a memorandum made by the Croatian opposition, all of which 
had been triggered off by the announcement of international summit.42 The suc-
cessor states were not mistaken in anticipating that their former enemies would 
try to avail themselves of the conference as a great stage for putting forward their 
grievances against the post-war order. The Hungarian government approached 
the British in respect to subjects it wanted to discuss at Genoa: the elaboration of 
articles dealing with treatment of minorities, reparations and restrictions of the 
neighbouring countries’ armies.43 Nor was Bulgaria any less eager to debate the 
territorial, military and financial clauses of the Treaty of Neuilly.44 The whole 
position was aptly summarised in Ninčić’s words ’that this country [Yugoslavia] 
could not do otherwise than follow the French lead in regard to the subjects to be 
excluded from the scope of the Conference, and the precise specification of the 
programme’ but would leave France and Britain to settle relations with the Soviet 
government and the German reparations question.45 
Finally, the representatives of thirty-four nations convened at Genoa 
from 10 April to 19 May. The full account of proceedings does not fall within the 
purview of this work but several moments were significant for the reassessment 
of diplomatic intercourse between Britain and the Little Entente. When the agree-
ment between Russian and German delegation was concluded in Rapallo on 16 
April on the basis of mutual renunciation of all financial claims and the restora-
tion of full diplomatic relations it looked as if the whole summit was about to be 
wrecked. The united front of capitalist countries vis-à-vis the Soviets was broken 
and even worse the formidable bloc of the two outcast nations was taking shape. 
Challenged by the Rapallo Treaty and striving for the way out that would not gi-
ve the impression of France being completely isolated from the rest of the Allies, 
the head of the French delegation, Luis Barthou, insisted on the inclusion of all 
the Little Entente states and Poland in the decision-making concerning the Rus-
so-German agreement.46 The latter thus all co-signed with the inviting Powers the 
                                                 
41 TNA, Young to Curzon, 2 March 1922, C 3263/458/62, FO 371/7421.  
42 Ibid.  
43 TNA, Hohler to Curzon, 8 March 1922, C 3525/458/62, FO 371/7421. 
44 TNA, Erskine to Curzon, 8 March 1922, C 3737/458/62, FO 371/7422.  
45 TNA, Young to Curzon, 2 March 1922, C 3263/458/62, FO 371/7421.  
46 DBFP, I, 19, No. 75, British Secretary’s Notes of an Informal Conversation held at the 
Villa Raggi, 17 April 1922.  
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protest note to German delegation as drafted by Lloyd George. Beneš and Skir-
munt even seconded Schanzer in his insistence on moderating some phrases of 
the note so as to make it more acceptable to the Germans.47 The influence of the 
‘Quadruple Entente’ tended to mitigate the French position rather than prod its 
intransigence. The final evidence of that moderating influence was given when 
Beneš refused the unofficial French proposal for the Little Entente to follow the 
French lead in abandoning the conference as directed against the British inte-
rests.48 He had to overcome the resistance of Poland and Romania which had ini-
tially intended to demonstrate their solidarity with France by leaving further deli-
berations.49 Beneš’s decisive stance seems to have had a profound effect in Paris. 
In his speech to the Chamber in June 1922 Poincaré admitted that had France 
walked out of Genoa after the conclusion of the Russo-German agreement she 
would have had do it alone.50  
The shifting towards some sort of arrangement with the Soviets that had 
already been discernible before Genoa summit continued during the course of the 
conference. Beneš had established regular contacts with Chicherin and started ne-
gotiations which would result in conclusion of the trade agreement between the 
two states on 5 June, shortly after the end of the conference.51 Ninčić gave assu-
rance to the latter to the effect that Yugoslavia would not be supporting an anti-
Soviet policy.52 When the negotiations with the Bolsheviks reached their peak in 
May it seemed that it was about time for the Little Entente definitely to come out 
in the open as to whether it should throw its lot with the British or the French. 
Beneš made up his mind: ’I think I shall join Lloyd George if his negotiations 
concerning the Russian matters come to some kind of closure. At the same time 
I will not in any case publicly express myself against France.’; as for the posi-
tion of the member states of the Quadruple Entente he communicated to Pra-
gue: ’Our basic principal position as before will be to preserve at any cost the 
unity of the Little Entente irrespectively of different tendencies of the particular 
states.’ Those tendencies, in Beneš’s words, meant that Czechoslovakia and Po-
land ‘were wary of siding openly with France… Romania is decisively for 
France for its hostility towards the Soviets… Ninčić is hesitating…’53 The col-
                                                 
47 DBFP, I, 19, No. 76, British Secretary’s Notes of a Meeting held at the Villa Raggi, 
18 April 1922.   
48 Jazkova, Malaja Antanta v evropejskej politike, 223.  
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50 Jazkova, Malaja Antanta v evropejskej politike, 223.  
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lapse of the summit, however, saved the Little Entente statesmen from taking 
painful decisions.  
As could have been predicted from the outset, the real strain on the re-
lations between Britain and the Little Entente threatened rather from the thras-
hing out of minor but vitally important questions for the stability of the succes-
sor countries than from the main issues on the conference agenda. At the start 
of the conference Count István Bethlen, Hungarian Prime Minister, tried to im-
pose the subject of national minorities into the discussion but was frustrated by 
Beneš.54 The Hungarian maneuver gave rise to suspicion among the Little En-
tente countries as to the possible involvement of Lloyd George in the matter. 
According to Ninčić a prevalent belief was created that the Prime Minister had 
promised the Hungarians his backing. If British support for Count Bethlen had 
proved real, the Foreign Minister intimated to Gregory, he and his allies would 
have certainly followed France had she decided to leave the conference.55 There 
is no proof of such an undertaking on the part of Lloyd George but the suspi-
cion might have been provoked due to the Prime Minister’s attempt to discuss 
the territorial settlement of Wilno and Eastern Galicia which had been rebuf-
fed by joint effort of Poland, Little Entente and France.56 The resistance offe-
red by Quadruple Entente proved highly effective and all the questions pertai-
ning to territorial disputes and national minorities were referred to the League 
of Nations.57  
To fully understand Lloyd George’s position in respect to problems ari-
sing from the peace treaties it is necessary to bear in mind that he viewed them 
in conjunction with the Russian question. In his opinion a successful outcome 
of economic and legal negotiations with the Soviets would have to be supple-
mented with a comprehensive political agreement that would establish the pea-
ce of Europe on a firm basis. To that end the Prime Minister devised the instru-
ment of a non-aggression pact. His draft of a non-aggression pact58 was luke-
warm and did not provide for a single sanction. In fact, Soviet Russia’s signatu-
re, implying the approval and sanctioning of the existing order, would be its so-
le value as that country stayed out of the League of Nations, along with Ger-
many, and thus was not bound by the peacekeeping clauses of its Covenant. In 
order to clear the ground for conclusion of such a treaty all territorial feuds 
had to be dealt with and particularly those on the Russian border. Lloyd Geor-
ge was prepared to engage himself as a go-between in settling the vexed fron-
tiers of East Central Europe but the moment it became obvious there was no 
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hope for an understanding with the Bolsheviks he completely lost interest in 
the matter.59  
For the same reason Lloyd George did not take into consideration the 
draft of a non-aggression pact proposed by Beneš on behalf of all his allies. 
The Czechoslovak premier suggested a far-reaching agreement with precise 
stipulations providing for the inviolability of the peace treaties, sanctions in 
case of its breach and the conclusion of special arrangements among certain 
states to that effect.60 By means of the last provision Beneš strove to reinforce 
the position of the Little Entente within the larger framework of non-aggres-
sion treaty. He carefully took the opportunity to impress upon Lloyd George 
his view of the Little Entente as an entity capable of guaranteeing peace ’in 
the regions south of Germany and south of Carpathians, but not on the eastern 
frontiers of Poland and Romania’ and pointed out that it ’could not take the 
place in French policy which Russia had formerly occupied’ that is to say 
’create a barrier on the eastern side of Germany’.61 Though his exposition co-
uld have hardly been more designed for the British consumption it did corre-
spond to his true views as to the role that the Little Entente should undertake 
in the post-war European settlement. Nonetheless, Beneš’s draft was unpala-
table to the British. ‘Were they adopted in their entirety, Dr. Benes’s propo-
sals would doubtless be a great coup for the French, and incidentally for the 
Little Entente and Poland’, Ralph Wigram, the second secretary at the Central 
Department, mused.62 The peace treaties would, Wigram went on, be specifi-
cally confirmed by both vanquished and neutrals for the benefit of the victors 
who would also retain the right to take coercive measures, France against 
Germany and the Little Entente against Hungary. He propounded an opinion 
held by many Britons when he deplored such a course of action which he be-
lieved had nothing to recommend itself either to former enemies or to Europe 
at large.         
Closer examination of the course of preparation for and the proceedings 
of the Genoa Conference indicates that the usual perception of the Little Enten-
te’s attitude as obstructive and therefore, among the other reasons emanating 
from the Anglo-French differences, partly responsible for the final failure of 
Lloyd George’s over ambitious scheme is rather one-sided. Far from being irre-
concilable with British plans, the Little Entente countries took the middle ground 
between London and Paris, and were mostly concerned with the possibility of 
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rupture between the two Principal Allies. In their endeavour to facilitate a com-
mon allied policy they went a long way to meet British requests for a rapproche-
ment with the Bolsheviks in spite of their own reservations. The shift towards the 
British position was gradual and mostly due to the mediating efforts of Beneš. In 
the process the unity of the Little Entente and her association with Poland were 
put to test. Nevertheless, the conciliatory tendency represented by Czechoslova-
kia and Yugoslavia prevailed in the Quadruple Entente. Moreover, this moderate 
attitude forced France not to show herself as irreconcilable to British policy to-
wards both Russia and Germany and presumably prevented her from leaving the 
conference.  
However, the perception of the Little Entente’s policy formed by Lloyd 
George was a very different one. To his mind the alliance was too close to 
France and he disliked its having an important role at Genoa as something bo-
und to augment the difficulties of his endeavour. Shortly after the conference it 
was said that Lloyd George ’became firmly convinced about half way through 
the Conference that M. Benes was playing a double game and inciting the Bol-
sheviks to resist any proposals in order to leave the ground clear for the separa-
te agreement between his Government and them.’63 Lloyd George appears to 
have placed his faith in certain ‘quite independent and reliable’ sources64 that 
misled him into erroneous political calculations. The Foreign Office staff disa-
greed with his interpretation of Czechoslovakian bad faith. Alexander Leeper, 
the second secretary, wrote to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Sir Eyre 
Crowe: ’Nothing has annoyed me more than the lies disseminated about Benes 
& his alleged ’disloyalty’ at Genoa. I have little doubt that the stories were 
spread by the Italians & the Vatican both of whom are anxious to discredit 
Czechoslovakia & break up the Little Entente.’65 Crowe entirely shared his opi-
nion. This was but another example of the Foreign Office’s opinion being by-
passed and ignored by a Prime Minister prone to conduct private and secretive 
diplomacy to which a few people belonging to his immediate entourage were 
privy.66 Thus, professional diplomats were unable to remedy the misconcepti-
ons of their chief. There was also a more prosaic reason for the Prime Mini-
ster’s resentment for the Czech. As confirmed by his private secretary Edward 
Grigg, Lloyd George had a grievance against Beneš because of the latter’s 
’constant communication’ with Wickham Steed, the editor of The Times and a 
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fierce critic of the British Prime Minister.67 In any case, British policy missed 
an opportunity to take the chances offered to it by the accommodating spirit of 
the Little Entente that could have otherwise allowed it to make more headway in 
pursuing its goals.  
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Dragan Bakić 
 
VELIKA BRITANIJA, MALA ANTANTA 
I ĐENOVSKA KONFERENCIJA 1922.  
 
Rezime  
 
 
U članku se razmatra britanska politika prema Maloj Antanti u kontekstu 
priprema za Đenovsku konferenciju 1922. godine i u toku same konferencije. Sa-
vez Male Antante i njegov pokretački duh, kao i čehoslovački premijer i ministar 
spoljnih poslova Edvard Beneš imali su potencijalno bitnu ulogu u okviru konfe-
rencije, jer su svojom podrškom ili opstrukcijom mogli da pomognu Lojdu Džor-
džu ili francuskoj delegaciji predvođenoj Lujem Bartuom da lakše nametnu svoja 
rešenja. U situaciji kada su britanska i francuska delegacija imale različite pogle-
de na osnovna pitanja kojom se konferencija bavila, podrška ostalih učesnika mo-
gla je da bude od velikog značaja. Članak pokazuje kako je britanska politika, pre 
svega Lojd Džordž, nastojala da minimizira ulogu Male Antante polazeći od pret-
postavke da će ona neminovno i potpuno stati na stranu Francuske. Zemlje-člani-
ce Male Antante, na drugoj strani, bile su rešene da se po svaku cenu odupru 
upotrebi Đenovske konferencije kao platforme sa koje bi se, pod plaštom eko-
nomske rekonstrukcije, pokrenula diskusija o reviziji posleratnih granica i usvoji-
le mere koje bi narušile njihov politički suverenitet. U ključnim političkim pita-
njima sa kojima je Lojd Džordž želeo da se uhvati u koštac, kao što su reparacije 
i uspostavljanje diplomatskih odnosa sa Sovjetskom Rusijom, Mala Antanta nije 
bila protivna britanskim koncepcijama ili je ispoljavala spremnost da se značajno 
približi britanskom gledištu. Lojd Džordž nije prepoznao ovu ponešto stidljivu, 
ali ipak uočljivu tendenciju Male Antante da drži ravnotežu između Londona i 
Pariza strahujući od otvorenog rascepa između svojih velikih ratnih saveznika. 
Njegov negativan stav prema Maloj Antanti koji je, po svoj prilici, u velikoj meri 
bio diktiran iskrivljenom percepcijom Benešove politike tokom same konferen-
cije, nije bio od pomoći u ostvarivanju njegovih vlastitih ambicioznih ciljeva u 
Đenovi.   
 
